“But don’t go home too absolute!” (Mephisto): The Reception of Fichte’s Subjective Idealism in Goethe’s Faust

Abstract

1. In the second act of the second part of Goethe’s Faust, Mephistopheles, disguised as Faust, sarcastically addresses a former student, now a bachelor, with the words: “But don’t go home absolute!” (“kommt nur nicht absolut nach Haus,” V. 6736) (Goethe 2001: 63). The remark clearly alludes to a central concept in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy, the “Absolute I” (“das absolute Ich”) (Gaier 2004: 87). It also signals Goethe’s critical stance toward this notion and toward Fichte’s philosophy more broadly. This moment is not the only instance where Fichte’s presence resonates in Goethe’s text. Throughout Faust, the critique and reception of Fichtean thought recur persistently. The fact that, in the first part of the tragedy, Faust translates the logos, which occurs in the Greek Gospel of John, as “deed,” “action” (“die Tat”) likewise reflects, in my view, impulses that stem directly from Fichtean philosophy.
2. Moreover, when the bachelor, in his discussion with Mephistopheles disguised as Faust, brings forward the concepts of action (“da wird was getan”) and creation (“schafft”), this aligns him closely with Fichte’s ideas. At this point it becomes clear that he shares the meaning of Fichte’s concepts of “Tathandlung” (primordial deed) and “Akt” (act): “Man’s life is in his arteries, and when Are they so vibrant as in younger men? There the fresh blood full of strength Creates new life from its own life again („schafft“). There all works, and things get done, The waverers fall, the capable get on. („da wird was getan“) [V. 6774-6784] (Goethe 2001: 64). It is evident that the bachelor is “Fichtean,” and Mephistopheles—disguised as Faust—also perceives him as a “Fichte” or “Fichtean,” as becomes clear when he mocks him ambiguously during their exchange: I see you’re bold and resolute (It is noteworthy that this determination, perseverance, and intensity were highly characteristic of Fichte in his own life. K.B) But don’t go home absolute! („Ganz resolut und wacker seht Ihr aus / Kommt nur nicht absolut nach Haus“) [V. 6735-6736] (Goethe 2001: 63). As I have noted, it is clear here that with the word “absolutely” (“absolut”) Mephisto is alluding to the central concept of Fichte’s philosophy-the “Absolute I” (“das absolute Ich”) (Gaier 2004: 87). Accordingly, through his ambiguity Mephisto sarcastically points out to the bachelor that he is still far from becoming an Absolute I, that is, far from attaining divine perfection, which would mean fully comprehending the entire world, fully knowing oneself, and then, through one’s own power, recreating a new, perfected world. His remark implies that the bachelor’s striving for wholeness, perfection, and the Absolute is futile.
3. Thus, the appearance of the “terms,” phraseology, and formulations of German Idealism in the text of Faust is by no means accidental. For example, Goethe’s concepts of “Tat” (deed) and “Tätigkeit” (activity) correspond to Fichte’s notions of “Tathandlung” (primordial deed) and “Akt” (act), while the ethical and epistemological content of Fichte’s “Handeln” (acting) aligns with Goethe’s notion of striving (“streben”). This is entirely unsurprising, since German Idealism constitutes one of the most powerful currents of modern philosophy, and in Faust—a fundamentally modern text in which the events and impulses of modern history are refracted (Bregadze 2024: 403–496)—it is natural that the critique and reception of German Idealism, as well as its terminology and borrowed formulations, should emerge to varying degrees. This is all the more expected given that Goethe, aside from Kant, personally knew all the major representatives of German Idealism—Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling—and maintained relations with them; and furthermore, that he studied the philosophical works of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel with great care. For instance, Goethe closely examined Hegel’s major work Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807) (Safranski 2013: 474, 571) and the young Schelling’s Naturphilosophie treatise Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797) (Metzler Goethe… 2004: 380). As for Kant, Goethe began studying him after returning from his Italian journey: in the winter of 1790/1791 Goethe read two works from Kant’s critical period—Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781) and Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790) (Molnár 1998: 168–171).